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ABSTRACT 
The extension of anti-money laundering (AML) controls to 
lawyers has been an object of controversy since the early 2000s. 
Facing these measures, the legal profession has adopted different 
strategies of response, three examples of which are examined and 
contrasted in this Article. In the United States, the legal profession 
vocally objected to the measures and has been able to deflect any 
legislative action. In the United Kingdom, the profession actively 
engaged with ambitious new rules, while in France, the legal 
profession made maximum use of the levers of self-regulation allowed 
by the European directives. This Article presents AML lawyer-
regulation as an example of the versatility of global regulatory norms 
which do not necessarily evict national traditions. It also presents the 
European Union as the bedrock of AML regulatory diffusion and 
critiques US professional resistance to these norms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International standards of anti-money laundering (“AML”) 
regulation involve placing control mechanisms at different access 
points into the international financial system.1 The inclusion of the 
legal profession into this regulatory regime in the early 2000s led to the 
imposition in various countries of obligations on lawyers that were 
modelled on those of financial institutions. Because they collided with 
traditional models of lawyer regulation and professional conduct, these 
obligations provoked a decades-long confrontation between 
lawmakers, courts, and legal professionals that played out in many 
countries. National legal professions implemented different strategies 
to deal with the new AML standards, leading to outcomes marked by 
the circumstances of each country and extent of domestic influence 
wielded by its legal profession. 
This Article will not analyze the substance of the AML standards 
in detail, or their theoretical justification, as they have amply been 
described elsewhere. Rather, the objective here is to compare and 
contrast the strategies that were adopted in specific countries by 
national legal professions, the diversity of resulting outcomes, and the 
empirical response that can be identified in countries where hard-law 
rules were introduced. In other words, this is an account of the 
resistance strategies deployed by lawyers and their professional 
organizations against obligations initially perceived by them to be 
excessive, imposed from the outside, or contrary to traditional 
standards of professional conduct and culture. 
 
1. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO 
COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 95-97 (2010) (citing a 
FATF report of February 1990 emphasizing the need for detection at entry points); Peter 
Alldridge, Money Laundering and Globalization, 35 J.  L. & SOC’Y 437, 442 (2008)(explaining 
that in addition to prohibition (i.e. criminalization), AML involves preventative measures such 
as “regulation of markets and imposition of reporting obligations”).   
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This Article proceeds by way of case studies selected to highlight 
salient differences. The first case study is that of the United States. In 
the United States, AML lawyer-related standards are referred to as the 
“Gatekeeper Initiative,” a designation which is not neutral and reflects 
the profession’s continuing opposition to these measures.2 The US 
legal profession has to this day successfully deflected any mandatory 
introduction of AML standards, putting forward instead diluted 
voluntary measures under the control of its self-governance bodies, 
rather than external regulators.3 The US strategy has been successful 
mainly because of the significant resources, organization, influence 
wielded by lawyers  in American society in general, and influence by 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) in particular. At the other end 
of the spectrum are two case studies drawn from the European Union, 
where prospects of hard-law AML standards materialized early on. The 
European legal profession was collectively unable to counter the 
legislative tide; after unsuccessful court challenges by some of the 
national professions, binding measures were eventually imposed on 
all.4 These professions have dealt since then with their  AML 
obligations through differentiated strategies, which reveal a divide 
between the British profession, which has very actively engaged in 
AML procedures including suspicious transaction reporting, and 
Continental countries where suspicious transaction reporting  is 
scarcer.5 The United Kingdom will accordingly be used as a second 
case study, followed by France as an example of a Continental 
response.6 The last section of this Article will attempt to draw out wider 
lessons from these differentiated strategies. 
A final word of introduction is to mention the particular case of 
Canada. In contrast to the United States, but similar to the European 
 
2. See infra Part III. 
3. See infra Part III. 
4. See infra Part V. 
5. See infra Parts IV and V. 
6. For a comparative study by economists of the responses in the UK and Sweden, see 
Karin Svedberg Helgesson & Ulrika Mörth, Involuntary Public Policy-making by For-Profit 
Professionals: European Lawyers on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 54 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 1216 (2016). See also Nathaniel Tilahun Ali, States’ Varied Compliance 
with International Money Laundering Standards for Legal Professionals, 88 NORDIC J. INT’L 
L. 280, 280 (2019) (concluding that the varied national responses to the AML duties of lawyers 
reflect not national commitment to the rule of law but differences “in the philosophical 
inclinations of judiciaries over how the legal profession serves the public interest” and “a turf 
war over the administration of the legal profession”). 
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Union, Canadian legislators were at the forefront of AML regulation 
and able to push through legislation imposing AML obligations onto 
Canadian lawyers in 2001.7 The mandatory reporting obligation was, 
however,  countermanded by the courts as contrary to Canadian 
constitutional principles.8 Therefore, it seems that the Canadian legal 
profession was unable to block legislation, but successful in achieving 
protection by the courts against suspicious transaction reporting,9 
something the European profession was not able to achieve. Canada 
would be an interesting fourth case study for this Article, but will be 
set aside in the interest of brevity. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AML LAWYER-RELATED 
REGULATORY REGIME 
While this Article does not analyze the substance of the AML 
lawyer-related regime, it is necessary nevertheless to say a few 
introductory words to place it in historical perspective. As is well-
known, the body in charge of producing global AML norms since 1989 
has been the Financial Action Task Force, (“FATF”), an 
intergovernmental body headquartered in Paris and lodged by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). 
The initial objective of the global AML regimes produced in the 1980s 
and 1990s was to combat the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking 
by measures primarily applicable to the banking sector.10 It soon 
became apparent, however, that criminal organizations were turning to 
 
7. See MICHELLE M. GALLANT, LAWYERS AND MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: 
TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE SECRECY IN CANADA 1 (2013); Ronald J. MacDonald, Money 
Laundering Regulation – What Can be Learned from the Canadian Experience, 2010 J. PROF. 
LAW. 143, 144 (2010). 
8. Canada (A.G.) v. Federation of Law Societies, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.). 
9. On the debates that occurred at the time, see generally GALLANT, supra note 7; 
MacDonald, supra note 7. 
10. The FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF] 
(June 2019), www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.p
df [https://perma.cc/CAX9-RADJ] [hereinafter FATF 2012 Recommendations].  The original 
recommendations produced by the FATF in 1990 were entitled the “Forty Recommendations.” 
The  Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force On Money Laundering, FATF 
(1990), https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.p
df [https://perma.cc/V69W-3AL3].  
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more sophisticated methods to launder gains, and that these methods 
involved the creation of legal entities and new categories of external 
service providers, such as lawyers and accountants.11 The idea of 
including these professions into the AML regulatory regime was first 
mooted at the political level by a G8 summit held in 1999 in Moscow.12 
At that meeting, the heads of government decided collectively to 
“consider requiring or enhancing suspicious transaction reporting by 
the ‘gatekeepers’ to the international financial system, including 
company formation agents, accountants, auditors and lawyers, as well 
as making the intentional failure to file the reports a punishable offense, 
as appropriate.”13 This was the first clear signal that lawyers were on 
the political radar screen. They were being bundled together with other 
services categories, a fact that would cause lawyer consternation,14 but 
in 1999 the G8 was merely committing to consider the measures. It 
used the expression “gatekeepers,” which was later somewhat 
discarded in actual AML regulatory production, except in the United 
States where it took on a powerful symbolic dimension, as will be 
argued in this Article. In July 2000, a G7 Meeting of Finance Ministers 
specifically tasked the FATF to revise its recommendations to include 
the gatekeepers.15   
The next and most dramatic milestone were the September 11  
attacks and EU adoption of the Second Directive on December 4, 
 
11. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 45-46; Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive: Lawyers as Gatekeepers and Whistle-Blowers, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 
25, 26-27 (2002). 
12. Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized 
Crime - Communique, FED. AM. SCIENTISTS ¶ 32 (Oct. 20, 1999),  
https://fas.org/irp/news/1999/10/991020-crime-rus.htm [https://perma.cc/RS9B-DA77].  
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., Int’l Bar Ass’n et al., A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money 
Laundering, AM. BAR ASS’N 5 (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventi
ngmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SK9-L328]. 
15. The G7 report states as follows:  
We take note that, as a follow-up to the October 1999 Moscow Ministerial Conference 
on Combating Transnational Organized Crime, an experts group was convened to 
study the issues related to the involvement of professionals such as lawyers and 
accountants (“gatekeepers” to the international financial system) in money 
laundering. We express our support for the continuation of this work. 
Report from G7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government, Actions Against 
Abuse of the Global Financial System, G7 INFO. CTR. ¶ B.5(a) (July 21, 2000), 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/abuse.htm [https://perma.cc/4LP5-N8Q8]; 
see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 106 (2010). 
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2001.16 The directive had been under discussion for several years, yet 
one of the areas of disagreement was precisely the inclusion of the legal 
professions.17 Commentators report that the European Commission 
was heavily influenced by the FATF,18 and that the Commission 
wanted to include the legal profession into the regime but the European 
Parliament was in favor of broader exemptions.19 Ultimately the 
Commission’s position prevailed and the Second Directive became the 
first fully documented and legally binding expression of the new 
regulatory standards that would become applicable to lawyers.20 It has 
since been followed by the Third,21 Fourth,22 Fifth, and Sixth 
Directives,23 all including identical or quasi-identical language 
regarding lawyers. It can therefore be argued that contrary to frequent 
commentary, the European directives are the real regulatory 
benchmark against which the standards issued by the FATF or in other 
national regimes should be compared. The Second Directive lawyer 
 
16. Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 30-32. 
17. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 230-31. 
18. Id. 
19. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 230 (citing VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, MONEY LAUNDERING 
COUNTER-MEASURES  IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 2013)). The Council 
was apparently aligned more with the Commission than the Parliament. See also the Opinion of 
the European Court of Justice Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro of 14 December 2006 
on Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des 
Ministres, E.C.R. I-5308, ¶¶ 10-16, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62005CC0305&from=CS [https://perma.cc/N5V4-4H7G] 
[hereinafter Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro]. See also Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 30-
32. 
20. See Directive 2001/97, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EU) [hereinafter Second Directive]. The 
language extending the AML regime to lawyers is at Article 2 introducing a new Article 2(a)5 
into the historical First Directive 91/308/EEC of 1991. 
21. Directive 2005/60, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15. On the preventive use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, see id. at 3 (entirely replacing the 
First and Second Directives) [hereinafter Third Directive]. Its main effects were to widen the 
definition of predicate offenses for money laundering, implement the principle of “risk-based” 
CDD and introduce the prohibition against tipping-off in connection with suspicious transaction 
reporting. 
22. Directive 2015/849, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73 (entirely replacing the Third Directive and 
entering into force on 26 June 2017) [hereinafter Fourth Directive]. Amongst its novelties was 
the enhancement of CDD obligations, in particularly in connection with PEPs, and introduction 
of mandatory beneficial ownership registers of EU companies. 
23. See Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending the Fourth Directive and due to 
be implemented by 10 January 2020) [hereinafter Fifth Directive]. See also Directive 2018/1673, 
2018 O.J. (L 284) 22, (adopted a few months after the Fifth Directive in order to expand and 
unify criminal law and tax evasion) [hereinafter Sixth Directive]. Generally, no major changes 
have been made to the lawyer-related provisions since the Second and Third Directives. 
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provisions actually pre-dated the corresponding FATF 
recommendations that were produced in 2003, with the revision of their 
historical “Forty Recommendations,”24 including Recommendation 12 
mandating inclusion of lawyers into the AML customer due diligence 
and record keeping regimes for certain types of activities and 
Recommendation 16 requiring lawyers to report suspicious 
transactions.25 The FATF is undoubtedly an influential body that has 
widened the geographical diffusion of AML standards and maintains 
its influence through a recurring peer review process. However, when 
one is dealing in regulatory regimes and examining the conduct of real-
life legal professions, reality is defined more by hard-law provisions 
that are legally binding than by proposed recommendations, and this is 
why EU law seems like the more relevant benchmark. 
As will be briefly set out in the following paragraphs, the 
provisions affecting lawyers in the European Union and FATF regimes 
comprise three main limbs. The first limb is the typology of covered 
activities that fall under AML obligations in the first place, when 
conducted by lawyers. The second limb regards the obligation to 
properly identify clients of covered activities and maintain records: this 
is often referred to as “client due diligence” (“CDD”), or “Know your 
Client” (“KYC”). The third limb is the mandatory reporting of 
suspicious transactions, subject to the respect of traditional rules 
regarding professional secrecy and legal privilege. This is usually 
referred to as “suspicious transaction reporting” (“STRs”) or 
 
24. The original Forty Recommendations of 1990 (supra note 10) and a first set of 
revisions adopted in 1996 did not extend  AML procedures to lawyers (for a copy of these 
documents, see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 269-84). The 1996 revisions recommended only that 
appropriate national authorities “consider applying Recommendations 10 to 21 and 23 to the 
conduct of financial activities as a commercial undertaking by businesses or professions which 
are not financial institutions.” (¶ 9). In its 2000-2001 Annual Report, FATF then wrote that “one 
solution offered by the experts this year is to encourage including [the legal] professions under 
the same anti-money laundering obligations as financial intermediaries when they perform 
similar functions” (¶ 80), and that its “working group will carefully analyse whether the FATF 
Forty Recommendations should be extended to cover certain categories of nonfinancial 
businesses and professions, and other financial intermediaries” (¶ 86(c)). Evidently this language 
was still tentative and not definitive. See Annual Report 2000-2001, FATF (June 22, 2001), 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2000%202001%20ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M8H6-9MTT]. 
25. The two Recommendations are now renumbered in the FATF 2012 Recommendations 
as Recommendations 22 and 23. The inclusion of these Recommendations in 2003 was 
facilitated by the Second Directive equivalents which had been adopted a few months earlier. 
See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 112). 
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“suspicious activity reporting” (“SARs”).26 Of these three limbs, the 
third has been the most controversial.27 
The current European language regarding the first limb of lawyer 
AML obligations is found in the Fourth Directive.28 According to its 
provisions, lawyers (or more precisely, “notaries and other 
independent legal professionals”) are “obliged entities” placed under 
AML obligations similar to banks or other financial institutions 
where they participate, whether by acting on behalf of and for their 
client in any financial or real estate transaction, or by assisting in 
the planning or carrying out of transactions for their client 
concerning the: 
(i) Buy and selling of real property or business entities; 
(ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; 
(iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities 
accounts; 
(iv) organization of contributions necessary for the creation, 
operation or management of companies; 
(v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies, 
foundations, or similar structures; [ . . . ].29 
In the FATF regime, this broadly corresponds to Recommendation 12 
of the 2003 Recommendations and Recommendation 22(d) of the 
currently applicable 2012 Recommendations as last updated in June 
2019. 
The second limb of the AML lawyer regime is the obligation for 
lawyers conducting these covered activities to properly identify their 
clients and maintain adequate documentation (CDD or KYC).30 This 
limb has given rise to much less controversy. In many countries, it has 
been seen as promoting good practices even outside of AML 
considerations.31  The third and final limb, the most controversial of the 
 
26. One should also add its corollary, the prohibition against tipping-off, which was added 
to the European system by the Third Directive. 
27. See infra Part III regarding the United States and Part V regarding the French reaction. 
28. This language is almost identical to the original definition introduced by the Second 
Directive in 2001. 
29. See Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 2(1)(3)(b) (originally in Article 2 of the 
Second Directive, supra note 20). 
30. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, ch. II; FATF 2012 Recommendations, supra note 10, 
Recommendations 10, 11, 17, 18 and 19. 
31. Most professional conduct rules requiring that lawyers properly identify their client as 
a necessary pre-condition to providing adequate representation. 
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three, is the obligation to report suspicious transactions and the 
prohibition on informing the client that a report has been made, a rule 
known as “no tipping off.” The reporting obligation is set out in the 
following terms in the Fourth Directive (in terms almost identical to the 
original 2001 language of the Second Directive): 
Member States shall require obliged entities, and, where 
applicable, their directors and employees, to cooperate fully by 
promptly: 
(a) informing the FIU, including by filing a report, on their own 
initiative, where the obliged entity knows, suspects or has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that funds, regardless of the 
amount involved, are the proceeds of criminal activity or are 
related to terrorist financing, and by promptly responding to 
requests by the FIU for additional information in such cases; 
and 
(b) providing the FIU, directly or indirectly, at its request, with all 
necessary information, in accordance with the procedures 
established by the applicable law. 
All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, shall 
be reported.32 
Recognition is given, however, to the specific circumstances of 
the legal profession.33 This is done through two mechanisms: first, 
reporting can be conducted not directly, but through national bar 
authorities, and second, reporting is never required for certain types of 
activity: 
By way of derogation [ . . . ], Member States may, in the case of 
[notaries and other independent legal professionals], designate an 
 
32. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 33(1). The equivalent is at Recommendation 23(a) 
of the  FATF 2012 Recommendations: “Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals 
and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a 
client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph 
(d) of Recommendation 22.” Reporting persons are then prohibited from disclosing the fact of 
that report to their client or any third person, a rule known as “no tipping off” (Article 39 of the 
Fourth Directive and Recommendation 21 of the FATF 2012 Recommendations applicable to 
lawyers as a consequence of Recommendation 23). 
33. Id. See also the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23 of the FATF 2012 
Recommendations, at 85 (“Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and 
accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to report their suspicions 
if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional 
secrecy or legal professional privilege”). 
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appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession concerned as the 
authority to receive the information [ . . . ]. [ . . . ] [T]he designated 
self-regulatory body shall [ . . . ] forward the information to the 
FIU promptly and unfiltered;34  
and 
Member States shall not apply the [reporting] obligations [ . . . ] to 
notaries [or] other independent legal professionals, [ . . . ] to the 
strict extent that such exemption relates to information that they 
receive from, or obtain on, one of their clients, in the course of 
ascertaining the legal position of their client, or performing their 
task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, 
judicial proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or 
avoiding such proceedings, whether such information is received 
or obtained before, during or after such proceedings.35 
The intention of EU lawmakers was clearly to exempt traditional 
lawyering activities from the reporting obligation. This is consistent 
with the fact that court and contentious activities are not included in 
“covered activities,” i.e. lawyers engaged in that kind of work are not 
“obliged entities” subject to AML obligations in the first place. Instead 
of referring back to domestic legislation or law, EU lawmakers 
preferred to craft their own vocabulary to describe these exemptions. 
For instance, they refer not to “legal advice,” but to “ascertaining the 
legal position of clients.” In the national instruments transposing the 
directives into each of the member states, however, the language tends 
to circle back to pre-existing and better-defined legal concepts such as 
“legal advice,”36 legal “privilege,”37 or “professional secrecy.”38 
These legal categories in the European Directives closely reflect 
the soft-law standards of the FATF. As has already been stated, there 
has been substantial alignment throughout the years between the 
normative AML production of the European Union and the 
 
34. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 34(1). 
35. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 34(2) (emphasis added). 
36. See, e.g., the expression “legal advice” (consultation juridique) used in the French 
statutory transposition of the Directives at Article L 561.3 of the Monetary and Financial Code 
(CMF). C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CODE] art. L 561.3 (Fr.). 
37. See, e.g., the expression “privileged circumstances” used at Section 330 of the British 
Proceeds of Crime Act (infra note 94).  
38. See, e.g, the concept of “professional secrecy” (secret professionnel) repeatedly used 
in the successive AML-related professional regulations produced by the French Conseil National 
des Barreaux (infra notes 157 and 166). 
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recommendations of the FATF. The key difference being, however, 
that norms produced by the European Union are not “soft-law,” but 
legally binding on the member states. 
III. THE UNITED STATES: KEEPING FEDERAL LAWMAKERS 
OUT 
The US legal profession is organized into 50 separate state bars 
and represented at the national level by the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”), a voluntary association of lawyers across the country.39 
Whether the profession is “self-regulated” or regulated principally by 
the judiciary has been the object of debate and is not directly relevant 
for this Article.40 What is more important is the national role that is 
played by the ABA, particularly in the production of benchmark 
standards of professional conduct for the profession,41 the exclusion of 
federal or state lawmakers from primary responsibility for the 
regulatory oversight of lawyers or production of rules of conduct, and 
the profession’s desire to protect this traditional division of tasks. 
Instances of federal involvement in lawyer regulation do exist, 
however. One example is in connection with the work of securities 
lawyers.42 In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the 
 
39. See The American Bar Association, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/ [https://perma.cc/TKZ4-5RD2] (last visited Nov. 
30, 2019). According to the ABA website, the ABA was founded in 1878. Its mission is “to 
serve [its] members,” “advocate for the profession,” “eliminate bias and enhance diversity” and 
“advance the rule of law.” 
40. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(stating that “[t]he legal profession is largely self-governing”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of 
Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (2009) (pointing out that “courts, 
commentators, and legal ethics regulators continue to conceptualize law as a “self-regulated 
profession”); Laurel S. Terry,  The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client & Public 
Protection Through Adoption of a Proactive Regulation System , 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
717, 721 (2016) (indicating that “the state supreme courts typically have the overarching 
responsibility for lawyer regulation . . . .”). 
41. Those currently in place are the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
were transposed, with variations, in the 50 fifty individual states via the state judiciaries MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 10. 
42. The practices of US tax lawyers are also subject to certain regulations by the IRS. See 
William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer, 74 
FORDHAM L.  REV. 947, 950 (2005). Other areas of lawyer activity where lawmakers or 
regulators have introduced rules that affect their conduct are banking, bankruptcy, class actions, 
criminal defense, debt collection, or insurance defense. On this “fragmentation” of lawyer 
regulation and rules of conduct, see John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
959, 961 (2009). 
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early 2000s, federal lawmakers instructed the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to issue guidelines on lawyer conduct when 
clients commit material violations of the securities laws.43 These rules, 
which were reflected in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Part 205 Rules of the SEC, were fiercely resisted by the profession at 
the time.44 It so happens that the debate on Section 307 and Part 205 
raged exactly at the same time the FATF was preparing to roll out its 
2003 Recommendations including the duties of lawyers. This Article 
will return to the possible effects of this coincidental timing later. 
At present, US lawyers are in the fairly unique position of not 
facing any mandatory regulatory requirements in connection with 
AML policy. This was made possible by the ABA’s active resistance 
from the very inception of what they immediately named the 
“Gatekeeper Initiative,” channeled through a specially formed “Task 
Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession.”45 The only 
measure that has been accepted by the US legal profession to date are 
“Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and 
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” that were issued 
by the ABA in 2010.46 These measures replicate to a certain extent the 
detailed “risk-based” client due diligence measures recommended by 
the FATF and introduced in the EU by the Third Directive,47 but they 
are only voluntary. The ABA’s “Voluntary Good Practices” document 
pointedly indicates that 
[i]t is not intended to be, nor should it be construed as, a statement 
of the standard of care governing the activities of lawyers in 
implementing a risk-based approach to combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing. Rather, given the vast differences in 
practices, firms, and lawyers throughout the United States, [it] 
 
43. Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 1017-18; JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 217 (2006). 
44. Id. 
45. Task Force On Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, AM. BAR ASS’N,  
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/gatekeeper/ [https://perma.cc/NZ3J-
GRMM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
46. ABA, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2010_am_116.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA Voluntary Good Practices]; ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 463 (2013) (endorsing the Voluntary Good Practices).  
47. Directive 2005/60, supra note 21, at 15-16. 
 
2019] AML AND LAWYER REGULATION 333 
seeks only to serve as a resource that lawyers can use in developing 
their own voluntary risk-based approaches.48 
Because of the absence of any binding legal obligation on lawyers 
(and other service professions), the United States has been rated “non-
compliant” in the relevant sections of the “Mutual Evaluations” 
conducted in 200649 and 201650 under the auspices of the FATF. 
According to the latest 2016 Mutual Evaluation report, the United 
States “regulatory framework has some significant gaps, including 
minimal coverage of certain institutions and businesses (investment 
advisers (IAs), lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, trust and 
company service providers (other than trust companies).” 51 To this it 
adds that “ . . . the vulnerability of these minimally covered [ . . . ] 
sectors is significant, considering the many examples identified by the 
national risk assessment process.”52 
This is not to say, however, that the United States is not doing 
anything at all, or that the international critique of the US framework 
has been entirely without effect. A few high-profile scandals likely 
helped to push some US governmental action. For example, the 
Panama Papers data leak and a 60 Minutes television program, which 
filmed several New York attorneys discussing techniques to conceal 
ultimate ownership of real estate before an NGO representative who 
was posing as the lawyer of a foreign official.53 Following these 
 
48. ABA Voluntary Good Practices, supra note 46, at 3.  
49. Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United States of America, FATF-GAFI 13-14 (June 23, 
2006), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20ES.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8APJ-VY79].  
50. FATF on Money Laundering & Asian/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, United 
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scandals, the US FIU Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) implemented territorial “targeting orders” imposing that 
specialized intermediaries known as real estate “title insurance 
companies,” which intervene in real estate acquisitions alongside banks 
and lawyers, identify the ultimate beneficial owners in certain types of  
transactions.54 US banks have also come under additional AML 
obligations introduced by FinCEN in recent years.55 It is notable, 
however, that these new AML obligations were placed not on lawyers, 
but on other intermediaries or banks. Lawyers have, until now at least, 
remained immune. 
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to return to the 
complex matrix of US lawyer regulation, which is often bewildering to 
outsiders because it involves multiple layers of tension and balancing. 
The traditional principle of US lawyer self-regulation (or regulation by 
the judiciary) must be balanced against the perceived risk of legislative 
or executive intervention, the powers of the fifty state bars must be 
balanced against the influence of the central organization (the ABA), 
and the powers of the states must be balanced against those of the 
federal branch. It seems that one of the ABA’s main objectives, when 
faced with the FATF standards, was to keep out the federal lawmakers 
and executive agencies: these were the points of contact through which 
the FATF and other foreign governments or organizations were 
perceived to be attempting to exercise influence on US regulatory 
design. This fear of federal interference as a result of foreign influence 
is very clear from the language of the 2010 “Voluntary Good Practices” 
document: it points out that the “government is under pressure from the 
FATF and others (including development agencies, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations) to adopt 
legislation implementing some or all of the provisions of the [FATF] 
Recommendations relating to the legal profession.”56 In this context, 
its overarching purpose was to promote voluntary standards that would 
 
54. See, e.g., US Treasury Department, FinCEN Expands Reach of “Geographical 
Territorial Orders” Beyond Manhattan and Miami, FINCEN (July 27, 2016),  
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-expands-reach-real-estate-geographic-
targeting-orders-beyond-manhattan [https://perma.cc/MAD6-VE8E]. 
55. See, e.g., US Treasury Department,  Customer Due Diligence Requirements for 
Financial Institutions, FINCEN (May 11, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2016-05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEH4-5DTX]. 
56. ABA Voluntary Good Practices, supra note 46, at 3. 
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be sufficiently widely implemented to “negate the need for federal 
regulation.”57 In other words, the ABA saw as its main mission not 
active participation in global regulatory design, including through the 
crafting and dissemination of standards that might be accepted as 
mandatory, but to avoid giving the federal government an excuse to 
intervene.58 
The US legal profession appears to have been fairly unified in its 
objection to the introduction of mandatory AML standards. Scholarly 
publications discussing the subject are generally critical of the 
measures, albeit in varying degrees. 59 The critique is not surprising, 
 
57.  Id. 
58. This ABA position is also reflected in its long-standing opposition to mandatory 
registration of beneficial ownership of US corporations, a policy which it views as indirectly 
introducing AML duties on lawyers. In this connection the ABA writes in 2018 that:  
“it opposes legislation and regulations that would impose burdensome and intrusive 
gatekeeper requirements on lawyers, including bills that would subject the legal 
profession to key anti-money laundering compliance provisions of the Bank Secrecy 
Act. If adopted, these measures would undermine the attorney-client privilege, the 
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and traditional state court regulation of the 
legal profession, while also imposing excessive new federal regulations on lawyers 
engaged in the practice of law.” 
Gatekeepers Regulations on Attorneys, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/indep
endence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/ [https://perma.cc/H5UE-DRMP] (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
59. Bruce Zagaris, The Gatekeepers Initiative: An Emerging Challenge for Professional 
Advisors Of International Business And Tax Matters, AM. BAR ASS’N, 18 (2002), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/
crimjust_taskforce_articles_gatekeepter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RUF-7Y54]; Bruce Zagaris, 
Gatekeepers Initiative – Lawyers and the Bar Ignore it at their Peril, 23 CRIM. JUST. 28, 32 
(2008) [hereinafter Zagaris (2008)]; Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper 
Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. 
L. J. 607, 612 (2009); Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and 
its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 JOUR. PROF. L. 3, 9 (2010) (this was a special issue of the 
ABA’s Journal of the Professional Lawyer containing other articles on the topic of FATF lawyer 
measures) [hereinafter Terry (2010)]; Laurel Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat 
Money Laundering& Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 487, 514 (2015) 
(commending the U.S. government and the U.S. legal profession for taking the “long view” in 
their approach to implementing FATF’s recommendations); Duncan E. Osborne, The Financial 
Action Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. REV. 422, 423 (criticizing the role 
of the FATF); Laurel S. Terry & José Carlos Llerena Robles, The Relevance of FATF’s 
Recommendations and Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations to the Legal Profession, 42 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 627, 729 (2018) (critical of FATF’s lack of engagement with the legal 
profession but supportive of more AML involvement by lawyers, in particular KYC/CDD). But 
see Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer’s Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and Terrorism? 72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 50 (2003) (noting that US professional rules 
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admittedly, when expressed by authors who were members of the ABA 
Task Force lobbying against the reforms. One member described the 
“Gatekeeper Initiative” as “astonishingly broad”60 and creating 
“unprecedented challenges to the sanctity of the attorney-client 
privilege, the duty of client confidentiality and the delivery of services 
generally in the American legal system.”61 In contrast, the work of the 
ABA Task Force, presumably the “Guardians at the Gate” of the 
article’s title, has been described as “an admirable battle against FATF 
and its member states in order to curb the excesses of the Gatekeeper 
Initiative.”   
To be fair, a portion of the US critique shares commonalities with 
some of the critique that initially emanated from the European 
professions. For example, it points to the unclear language used by 
FATF in its various definitions, the challenge posed by STR/SAR 
reporting obligations to traditional lawyer duties of confidentiality, and 
the absence of hard empirical data linking voluntary lawyer 
participation to money-laundering activity.62 However, where the US 
critique seems to stand out is its skepticism vis-à-vis what is presented 
as legal transplants from a non-legitimate, non-democratically elected 
organization (i.e. FATF). This is most clearly expressed in a 2008 
article by another member of an ABA working group: 
The FATF process of promulgating and then trying to implement 
AML standards for gatekeepers suffers from: (1) exclusion of 
major stakeholders from the decision-making process except for 
 
are likely to change). In line with its position on lawyer-related AML in the US, US scholarship 
is critical of the European directives regarding lawyers. Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 44; 
Danielle Jasmin Kirby, The European Union’s Gatekeeper Initiative: The European Union 
Enlists Lawyers in the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, 37 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 261, 261 (2008). 
60. Shepherd, supra note 59, at 670. 
61. Id. at 612. 
62. Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 29, 32. This argument has also been made by the 
European organizations. See Letter from John Fish, CCBE President to FATF Secretariat 
(September 9, 2002) at 3 (responding to the 30 May 2002 consultation) [hereinafter Letter from 
John Fish]. There is at least one US scholarly attempt to conduct empirical analysis. See Lawton 
P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney 
Facilitation of Money-Laundering Through Commercial Transactions, 2011 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 
36-38 (2011). The authors analyzed 40 Second Circuit cases and concluded that in 15% of these 
cases, there had been unwilling participation by a lawyer. Despite this finding, they 
recommended only that US attorneys be asked to certify that they voluntarily apply the Good 
Practices procedure. The FATF now comprises thirty-nine members (thirty-seven states and two 
regional organizations).  
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the 34 countries that are FATF members, (2) lack of adequate 
participation in policy making and implementation by the private 
sector, (3) lack of transparency in the decision-making process (the 
FATF’s deliberations on the recommendations occurred behind 
closed doors, without a record and without participation of elected 
officials or the private sector), (4) the use of economic sanctions 
and coercion in the way of blacklists as part of FATF’s initiative 
against noncooperative territories and jurisdictions without 
binding hard law, (5) differential and favorable treatment of its 
own members whose inadequacies have not resulted in 
blacklisting (e.g., noncompliance by the United States with the 
2003 gatekeeper initiatives), (6) the apparent efforts to usurp 
critical policy from democratically elected governments without 
their participation; and (7) questionable substantive policy design, 
such as the absence of any cost-effective measurements of the 
recommendations.63 
Similar thoughts are expressed by another author for whom “the 
FATF has been given an unsupervised and unmonitored license to 
address AML and CFT [Counter-Financing of Terrorism] problems,” 
and “has done so without thoughtfully considering the merits of its 
arguments and pronouncements, without any consideration whatsoever 
to costs, without meaningful engagement of the private sector, and with 
a willful obliviousness to both the reality and practical consequences 
of its work.”64 
This critique of the FATF is not isolated and has appeared in a 
number of other scholarly works on the general design of global AML 
law.65 However, it ignores the important fact that by the time the FATF 
had formally issued its 2003 Recommendations, a number of other 
democracies had already decided to introduce binding AML standards 
onto their own lawyers (in particular, as already noted, the European 
Union and Canada). There is also a tendency in US commentary to 
overstate the substantive content of what is actually required by the 
 
63. Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 31-32. 
64. Osborne, supra note 59, at 431. 
65. See, e.g., HEBA SHAMS, LEGAL GLOBALIZATION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND 
OTHER CASES 228 (2004) (“the FATF is procedurally illegimate on all scores”); Alldridge, 
supra note 1, at 443, 463 (“FATF is (deliberately) an unrepresentative agency attempting to 
enforce its standards worldwide”; “FATF must show much greater transparency and 
accountability than hitherto . . . .”).  
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FATF standards.66 Even authors sympathetic to AML objectives 
consider that the FATF’s overall approach (addressing lawyers 
together with other professions) is too “one-size-fits-all” and therefore 
seen by the profession as “fundamentally at odds with lawyers’ historic 
and globally-accepted values.”67 
Several comments can be made here. First, US scholars seem to 
be reading a lot into the mission and influence of FATF, a consultative 
body whose role is to produce soft-law standards, and which is entirely 
dependent on the actions of governments for the introduction and 
enforcement of these norms (and, it might be added, for its own 
existence and funding). At some point the concern was even expressed 
that the United States might risk expulsion from the FATF, a risk that 
was probably never very high.68 In reality, it is the EU that should be 
viewed as the powerful actor standing behind the FATF-designed AML 
norms. As will be argued below, the European experience is that these 
transnational regulatory norms can, in fact, be rolled out in different 
guises with varying outcomes that reflect national circumstances and 
professional cultures. In contrast, there seems to be an underestimation 
in the United States of the degrees of flexibility that must inevitably 
accompany such global regimes. It is not impossible to imagine that the 
same level of culturally-determined “idiosyncratic” implementation 
and enforcement of these norms could occur in the United States as it 
has in Europe. 
The second impression given by the US response to AML lawyer 
regulation is the emphasis that is placed on the idea of “lawyer 
exceptionalism.”69 Lawyers are presented not only as zealous 
advocates and protectors of clients against the state, but also as 
guardians of democracy and the rule of law. This self-image is not 
 
66. For example, Zagaris incorrectly states that the FATF initiative “threatens 
professionals with criminal penalties for failing to adhere to emerging standards of anti-money 
laundering . . . . due diligence.” Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 29.  This is not so: the FATF 
standards do not require criminalization, although some countries did choose to criminalize 
certain breaches, as will be explained below for the United Kingdom. See infra Part III. 
67. Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 721. For full clarity, Laurel Terry views some of the 
AML norms favorably (more precisely the KYC/CDD obligation), but she suggests that FATF’s 
lack of constructive engagement with the legal profession may have slowed down effective 
lawyer participation in AML. 
68. See Terry (2010), supra note 59, at 9. The present author’s comment, admittedly, has 
the enormous benefit of hindsight. 
69. See Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 
73 nn.8, 10 (2010).   
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unique to the US profession, but it appears to have been more 
successfully promoted within its domestic system than in other 
countries.70 The continuous references to “gatekeeper” regulation and 
the idea that this regulation is antithetical to the role of lawyers also 
tied the AML discussion together with other battles waged by the legal 
profession in the 2000s, particularly, against the SEC. This in turn 
raises the question of the contrast between the failure of foreign-driven 
AML gatekeeper measures, which were successfully deflected by the 
US profession, and the Sarbanes Oxley-related gatekeeper measures, 
which were partially imposed by the US Congress.71 
Indeed, although the coincidental timing may be serendipitous, it 
is difficult not to observe these two initiatives in a comparative light. 
Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and Part 205 of the SEC Rules 
were adopted in the aftermath of the Enron and WordlCom scandals, 
in which massive securities fraud was committed by the two companies 
leading to their collapse and severe financial loss by employees and  
shareholders.72 The crisis led to the loss of self-regulation by the 
accounting profession,73 and indictment (followed by collapse) of 
Arthur Andersen, one of the then Big Five accounting firms.74 The 
question many were asking at the time was “where were the 
lawyers?”75 Section 307 was the consequence: it gave express authority 
to the SEC to “prescribe minimum standards of professional conduct 
for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any 
 
70. See, e.g., the judicial challenges by the European professions described at Part V 
below.  
71. See the following paragraphs of this Part. 
72. Rex Nutting, Enron Workers Lost Everything, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 18, 2001), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/enron-workers-lost-everything-in-collapse-they-say 
[https://perma.cc/M9LM-LH2Y]. 
73.   Fast Answers: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), US SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspcaobhtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9X6-HSQG] (the PCAOB “is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee accounting professionals who provide 
independent audit reports for publicly traded companies” and “[w]hen Congress created the 
PCAOB, it gave the SEC the authority to oversee the PCAOB's operations, to appoint or remove 
members, to approve the PCAOB's budget and rules, and to entertain appeals of PCAOB 
inspection reports and disciplinary actions”). 
74. Scott Horsley, Enron and the Fall of Arthur Andersen, NPR (May 26, 2006), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5435092 [https://perma.cc/MN47-
6JN6]. 
75. Bernard S. Carrey, Enron-Where were the lawyers? 27 VT. L. REV. 871 (2002-2003). 
 
340 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:2 
way in the representation of issuers.”76 The standards had to “include a 
rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of 
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the 
issuer . . . .”77 Section 307 was a bipartisan proposal by US senators 
that “sailed through the Senate,”78 in July 2002, and was said to have 
caught the ABA “flat-footed.”79 In November 2002, the SEC went on 
to publish its proposed rules for public comment:80 they included not 
only “up-the-ladder” reporting (e.g. internal reporting within clients) 
but also, in certain circumstances, mandatory disclosure to the SEC that 
a lawyer was terminating his services or withdrawing his opinions (a 
procedure known as “noisy withdrawal”).81 At that point the ABA and 
state bars sprang back into action. They fiercely resisted mandatory 
noisy withdrawal, which ended up being removed from the final text of 
Part 205 in February 2003.82 After its initial passivity, the profession’s 
response to Sarbanes Oxley had become organized and effective. It had 
been too late to block the initial legislative action in July 2002 but it 
was able to mitigate the aftershock by reducing the scope of lawyer 
obligations in the months that followed. In March 2003, one of the 
ABA Task Forces on corporate responsibility explained that “lawyers 
for [a] corporation—whether employed by the corporation or specially 
retained—are not ‘gatekeepers’ of corporate responsibility in the same 
fashion as public accounting firms. . . . . Lawyers are first and foremost 
counselors to their clients . . . .”83 Drawing on the traditional 
representation of lawyers as advocates and defenders, considerable 
effort was invested to differentiate lawyers from accountants or other 
gatekeeper professions. 
 
76. SEC Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M8LA-NVFE]. 
77. Id. 
78. COFFEE, supra note 43, at 217. 
79. Id. 
80. Kim, supra note 69, at 89. 
81. Id. at 90 n.116. 
82. Part 205 did, however, retain the rule of permissive external reporting, i.e. the right (as 
opposed to the obligation) to report certain violations to the SEC. Kim, supra note 69, at 91 
n.128. The difficulty is that it was not exactly replicated in the ABA Model Rules nor in the 
conduct rules of many of the 50 states. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: 
Retaliation Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 
YALE J. REG. 491 (2016). 
83. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 
BUS. LAW. 145, 156 (2003). 
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These events coincided with FATF’s preparatory work on AML 
standards that could also affect lawyers. A July 2001 meeting of G7 
finance ministers in Rome had asked that its process of revising its 
recommendations be “open, transparent and consultative.”84 A 
consultation paper in preparation for what would become the 2003 
Recommendations was therefore published on 30 May 2002.85 
According to the account of participants in the ABA’s  Gatekeeper 
Task Force, the ABA provided its response to that consultation in May 
2003, in other words very soon after its successful efforts to reduce the 
impact of Part 205.86 The shock of Section 307 was presumably still 
fresh in memories, and concerns as to future regulatory direction were 
likely high. Did this context color the organization’s response to the 
FATF consultation? It is not impossible to think so. Yet at the same 
time, the ABA’s consistent opposition to any AML regulation since 
2003 can be seen as an indication that their response would have been 
the same even without the Sarbanes Oxley alert. 
What is equally intriguing is that full-scope Sarbanes Oxley 
measures (including mandatory noisy withdrawal) had found 
widespread support within the US legal academia. Scholarly voices 
pointed out that the ABA’s Model Rules had themselves included noisy 
withdrawal,87 and others disagreed with the idea that corporate lawyers 
could never act as gatekeepers.88 To date, the same has not been true, 
for AML lawyer regulation. At this point, US academia seems not to 
have attempted a full throated defense of AML control measures as 
they are practiced elsewhere. The soundness of the CDD/ KYC limb is 
acknowledged by some,89 but professional resistance to its explicit 
 
84. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 107. 
85. Shepherd, supra note 59, at 622. 
86. Id. The European CCBE provided its response in September 2002. See Letter from 
John Fish, supra note 62. 
87. Kim, supra note 69, at 91. 
88. See COFFEE, supra note 43, at 193.  See also id. at 192 (“presenting the attorney as 
primarily an advocate profoundly misrepresents the functional activity of the corporate lawyer”). 
His proposal is mandatory review or certification of corporate disclosures by independent 
lawyers, presenting this “as a response to both the problem of fragmentation [of legal services 
leading to insufficient understanding of client activities] and the need to empower the lawyer as 
a gatekeeper”). Id. at 232 (emphasis added). 
89. See Jack Sahl, Lawyer Ethics and the Financial Action Task Force: A Call to Action, 
59 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 457, 483 (2015) (“the [US] bar needs to recognize […] that […] 
resistance is unwarranted with respect to the FATF’s CDD principles, which promote both 
lawyers’ and the public’s interests.”); Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 691-92 (arguing that 
KYC/CDD obligations are already implied in the Model Rules,  and seeming to advocate making 
 
342 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:2 
expression as a mandatory obligation has not yet been overcome.90 Nor 
has any defense of the STR/SAR measure been, to date, offered,even 
with the associated professional privilege exemption. It is as if the 
critique of FATF and its processes had overtaken the domestic question 
of how to more effectively enlist US lawyers in AML policy.91 
To summarize, the US picture is one of a profession very well 
organized for the domestic defense of its interests, which has focused 
its efforts on criticizing the FATF as an institution and individual AML 
measures on their merits, and has in parallel promoted partial measures 
to pre-empt any attempts at federal intervention. However, on the 
whole, however, compared to other professions in advanced 
democracies, its steadfast refusal to participate in any mandatory AML 
measures for almost twenty years places it in the position of an outlier. 
IV. LAWYERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: COMPLYING WITH 
AMBITIOUS LEGISLATION 
Judging by its headcount, the size of its market, and the number 
of global UK-headquartered law firms, 92 the British legal profession 
 
this more explicit); Kevin Shepherd, ABA Needs a New Model Legal Ethics Rule, LAW360 (Apr. 
6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/910316/aba-needs-a-new-model-legal-ethics-rule 
[https://perma.cc/C92U-96VR] (arguing, contrary to some of his previous positions, that “the 
ABA should seriously consider developing and adopting a new model legal ethics rule to ensure 
that lawyers conduct the reasonable client due diligence needed to avoid facilitating money 
laundering”).    
90. Stephanie Brooker & Joel Cohen, Overview of Recent AML Gatekeeper International 
and U.S. Developments, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING 2018 1, 7 (Global Legal Group ed., 2018) (referring to the ABA’s continued 
opposition but also to “some movement […] within the ABA to adopt a model rule that would 
obligate attorneys to perform risk-based due diligence on prospective clients or matters” and 
that “significantly, such a rule would subject non-compliant attorneys to discipline by the state 
bar rather than by the government”).   
91. An additional factor is that the US conversation on lawyers’ AML role has become 
intertwined with the ABA’s equally long-standing resistance to corporate transparency reform, 
also an AML global norm. See Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 637-38 n.39. Scholarly 
positions critical of the ABA do seem to be appearing in regard to this last policy regarding 
corporate transparency. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Why does the American Bar Association 
Oppose Beneficial Ownership Transparency Reform?, THE FACT COALITION (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://thefactcoalition.org/american-bar-association-aba-oppose-beneficial-ownership-
transparency-reform?utm_medium=blog [https://perma.cc/6TMA-JZYL].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
92. The number of practicing solicitors and barristers is approximately 167,000 in 2019. 
See, for solicitors, Population of solicitors in England and Wales, SOLICITORS REG. AUTH., 
https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/statistics/regulated-community-
statistics/data/population_solicitors/ [https://perma.cc/F63L-99X6] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
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might be viewed as the second most influential after the US profession, 
certainly in the commercial sector.93 Its attitude towards AML 
regulation, however, has been the polar opposite of the American 
attitude. In no small part, this may be explained by the British 
government’s early embrace of AML regulation, and its willingness to 
thrust the full force of these rules onto its lawyers from the very outset. 
In contrast to other countries, AML awareness seems to have 
appeared in the United Kingdom comparatively early. By October 2001 
the UK lawmakers had already presented their bill for the future 
Proceeds of Crime Act (“POCA”), an ambitious instrument creating 
new tools against money-laundering, in other words they had acted in 
this area before the September 11 attacks and the Second Directive.94 
In 2002, the English Law Society issued what was already a revised 
professional guidance note on the subject.95 In 2003, POCA was then 
 
For barristers, see Statistics on practising barristers, BAR STANDARDS BD., 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/news-publications/research-and-statistics/statistics-
about-the-bar/practising-barristers.html [https://perma.cc/2FPV-VAR8] (last visited Nov. 30, 
2019). In addition there are a large number of unregulated legal practitioners in the UK practising 
in what is known as the “alternative” (i.e. unregulated) legal services market. The sector is 
considered to be the largest in Europe and a significant contributor to the British economy. See, 
also, the figures drawn from the US Trade Representative presented by Laurel Terry at an ABA 
US-UK Roundtable in November 2018, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Laurel_Terry_US_UK_US
TR_emailed_2-slide_format.pdf [https://perma.cc/824H-4XWT] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
93. The relative domination of the US and UK professions has been commented on 
elsewhere and from many different angles. For French efforts to better understand the economic 
benefits of having a globally influential legal system and profession, see PASCAL DURAND- 
BARTHEZ & FRANCOIS LENGLART, CHOISIR SON DROIT: CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DU 
CHOIX DU DROIT APPLICABLE DANS LES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX (2012). For a critique of 
US/UK dominance, see KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES 
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 135 (2019) (commenting on “the remarkable dominance of English 
and New York law for the coding of global capital”). 
94.  See generally Proceeds of Crime Bill, 2001 (Bill 31/330) (Gr. Brit..), available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/031/2002031.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MB7R-N6CZ]. The bill received Royal assent in July 2002. Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002,  c. 29 (U.K.) [hereinafter POCA], available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/pdfs/uksi_20170692_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JTA-4FVM]. The “failure to disclose: regulated sector” offence was already 
at Section 324 of the bill and became Section 330 of the act once adopted. In its original (2002) 
expression the provision applied to solicitors conducting investment or financial activities in 
addition to their principal activity. 
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amended to incorporate new elements from the Second Directive.96 
What is remarkable with POCA generally is that it went well beyond 
the requirements of the Second Directive (or FATF standards), by 
actually criminalizing AML duties and in particular the obligation to 
report suspicions.97 This was achieved by way of a specific offense for 
“failure to report” that became applicable to all professional legal 
advisers in the “regulated sector,”98 i.e., lawyers performing the 
designated transactional or financial activities.99 Following POCA and 
attendant 2003 Money Laundering Regulations,100 the English Law 
Society produced a pilot Anti-Money Laundering Guidance in 2004,101 
and a flow of suspicious transaction reporting by solicitors followed 
quickly thereafter, reaching very high numbers in the early years (e.g., 
11,300 reports in the year 2006/2007).102 The reporting flow has since 
significantly abated, but it is still higher than in other European 
countries. There can be little doubt that this significant flow of 
reporting activity by the British legal profession is explained, first and 
foremost, by the seriousness of the potential risk of criminal 
sanctions.103 
 
[https://perma.cc/BA4N-9HUC] (explaining that the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations 
applied to solicitors conducting investment or financial activities, see at 7).  
96. POCA, supra note 94. 
97. Colin Tyre, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations in the European Union, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 69, 77 (2010) (“… the UK went 
further in the 2002 Act than it was required to do by the terms of the First and Second 
Directives”). 
98. POCA, supra note 94, § 330. 
99. Id. The list of these activities is set out at Schedule 9 of POCA. It is similar to the 
language of the FATF Recommendations and Second Directive and includes: the buying and 
selling of real estate or business entities; managing of client money, securities or other assets; 
opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of contributions 
necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies; creation, operation or 
management of trusts, companies or similar structures. Id.  
100. Money laundering regulations were issued in 1993, 2003 and 2007. Those currently 
in force are The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on 
the Payer) Regulations 2017, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/pdfs/uksi_20170692_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZFL7-YYT2]. 
101. Money Laundering: Guidance for Solicitors, THE LAW SOCIETY (Jan. 2004), 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/archive/aml/money-
laundering-guidance-2004/ [https://perma.cc/JTS5-SPFK]. 
102. SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2008 41 (2008). 
103. The criminal risk is not an empty threat and solicitors have been imprisoned for 
failure to report. See, e.g.,. Regina v. Philip Griffiths, [2006] EWCA Crim 2155 (U.K.). 
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Chart 1: Number of “suspicious activity reports” (SARs) filed by 





























Annual reports by the British FIUs (first the Serious Organized 
Crime Agency, now the National Crime Agency) have provided 
various details over the years on the typology of these reports. At 
present, they mostly emanate from three areas of particular risk: 
company and trust formation, conveyancing (i.e. real estate 
transactions), and the holding of money in client trust accounts.  
According to recent statistics, approximately half of the SARs are said 
to relate to property  transactions,105 which does not seem surprising. 
Typically, the reports are filed before completion of transactions in 
relation to which a suspicion has arisen, or before accepting or 
transferring money in client accounts. The majority of  reports are so-
called “defense against money laundering” reports (“DAML”) (in 
2017/18, they represented 1,857 out of 2,592).106 These used to be 
 
104. NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, UK FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT: SUSPICIOUS 
ACTIVITY REPORTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2019 8 [hereinafter SAR 2019]; NATIONAL CRIME 
AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2018 6 [hereinafter SAR 
2018]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 
2017 12 [hereinafter SAR 2017]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY,: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
(SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2015 11 [hereinafter SAR 2015]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, 
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2014 12 [hereinafter SAR 2014]; 
SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2010 53-54; SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
REGIME, ANNUAL REPORT 2009 45 (2009); SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS 
ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 41 (2008). The numbers for 2007-2010 
include SARs filed by barristers, solicitors, and “legal other.” The numbers for 2011-2013 
include SARs filed by solicitors. The numbers for 2014-2019 include SARs filed by 
“independent legal professionals.” All of the annual reports cover a twelve-month calendar 
period straddling the designated reporting years except for the 2017 report which covered 
eighteen months (October 2015 to March 2017). 
105. SRA Risk Assessment, SOLICITORS REG. AUTH. (Mar. 2, 2018), 
www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/aml-risk-assessment.page [https://perma.cc/GN2G-
4A38]. 
106. SAR 2018, supra note 104, at 15-18. The numbers include SARs filed by barristers, 
solicitors and “legal other.” Id. 
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called “consent reports,” involve a latency period of seven working 
days and provide the reporting lawyers with a future defense against a 
principal money-laundering offense, thereby enabling them to mitigate 
their personal risk. Importantly however, these reports do not 
automatically require that lawyers withdraw from representation and 
can be filed by any persons, i.e. are not limited by POCA to the 
“regulated sector.”107 Situations can therefore arise where both a 
lawyer and her client file DAML reports with regard to the same object 
or transaction of a third party. This may be one explanation why British 
lawyers have not systematically interpreted the POCA reporting 
obligation as placing them in an excessively adversarial or disloyal 
position towards their clients.108 The objections that have been 
expressed by the profession are not so much that the duties are contrary 
to traditional rules of ethics or professional conduct, but that the regime 
is overly onerous in terms of compliance costs and personal risk 
management (see more on this below). 
The English regime is, in truth, very complex. It has been 
addressed in regularly updated guidance notes produced by the 
professional organizations (initially the Law Society for solicitors, now 
a combined group called the “Legal Sector Affinity Group,” which 
deals with AML for the combined professions and  unregulated 
practitioners).109 The latest guidance note, dated 2018, is more than 150 
pages long.110 It sets out in elaborate detail the extent of mandatory 
CDD procedures and, importantly, the rules regarding reporting to the 
FIU. The main objective is to balance the tension between the criminal 
risk incurred by individual lawyers who fail to report, and their 
 
107. See POCA, supra note 94, §§ 337, 338 (which relieve persons from obligations of 
confidentiality that may otherwise exist including outside of the regulated sector). 
108. See Hilary Hurd, Applying Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Obligations on 
Lawyers: the UK Experience, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 2, 2018), 
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2018/06/08/applying-anti-money-laundering-reporting-
obligations-on-lawyers-the-uk-experience/ [https://perma.cc/5XKR-YK8U]. 
109.  The British legal profession was liberalised by the Legal Services Act 2007 and 
comprises a number of independent practitioners who do not need to belong to one of the 
regulated professions (the latter including solicitors and barristers, but also legal executives, 
licensed conveyancers, notaries, costs lawyers, patent attorneys or trademark attorneys). 
110. See generally Legal Sector Affinity Group, Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for the 
Legal Sector, THE LAW SOCIETY (Mar. 2018), https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/articles/anti-money-laundering-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/V2CD-QL39]. As 
follows from the previous footnote it is addressed to all “independent legal professionals” and 
applies “across the entire legal sector” regardless of membership in one of the regulated 
professions. Id at 11.  
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obligation to protect information that is covered either by “privileged 
circumstances,” a new legal category introduced by POCA and 
described as a transposition of the EU Directives,111 or by the 
traditional English common law “legal professional privilege” (itself 
comprising “legal advice privilege” and “litigation privilege”).112 
These categories are not identical, respond to different definitions, and 
both operate to exclude reporting. Their interpretation in each 
individual case requires careful factual and legal analysis before a 
report can be filed. It is generally considered that in the early years at 
least, the complexity of the regime may have led to strategies of 
precautionary or defensive over-reporting, particularly in the absence 
of a minimal threshold.113 The fact that the number of reports has 
steadily declined over the years of annual SARs statistics production is 
therefore worthy of note. It may indicate that the profession has 
improved its grasp of the regime and no longer feels the need for 
defensive over-reporting. It is also possible that improved upstream 
CDD/KYC procedures have reduced the intake of AML-exposed 
clients and matters. 
An interesting question is why UK lawmakers decided to 
criminalize reporting duties in the first place. Full criminalization of 
anti-money laundering duties was not required by the FATF or Second 
Directive, or indeed under the Fifth Directive currently being rolled 
 
111.  Id, at 95 (“receipt of information in privileged circumstances is not the same as legal 
professional privilege. It is a creation of POCA designed to comply with the reporting 
exemptions set out in the European directives”). 
112.  Id. at 100-02. For an analysis of the articulation between the failure to disclose offense 
and English rules on legal privilege, see John A. Terrill II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of 
Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English 
Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433 (2015), concluding that “the U.K. approach of addressing 
matters of legal professional privilege through POCA is both complicated and worthy of the 
skepticism of the American Bar.” Id. at 454. 
113. “Defensive over-reporting” is when reporting agents are overly cautious and prefer to 
send a larger number of reports to FIUs than might be warranted by the specific facts in 
individual cases. The phenomenon is known in financial crime research and has been 
particularly examined in the UK banking sector. See, e.g., Amandine Scherrer, Fighting Tax 
Crimes – Cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, EUR. 
PARILIAMENT 45-46 (Mar. 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/598603/EPRS_STU(2017)598603
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/35K9-C4CD]. In the context of English solicitors, see Tyre, supra 
note 97, at 78; Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 112, at 445.  
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out.114 As mentioned above, the UK Proceeds of Crime bill creating the 
failure to report offense was introduced prior to the final adoption of 
the Second Directive.115 What were the reasons? One explanation 
would seem to lie in the general criminal justice agenda that was 
pushed in those years by Tony Blair and his Labour Party and, 
according to commentators, a combination of “moral imperative”116 
and desire to  solidify  the government’s “law and order” credentials.117 
To some extent, AML concerns in Britain are also traditionally 
exacerbated by the extent of financial ties with offshore financial 
centers located in its overseas territories or crown dependencies.118 
Many provisions of POCA were novel at the time. For example, they 
were amongst the first to extend money laundering beyond traditional 
predicate offenses, like drug trafficking, to all crimes, remove minimal 
thresholds, and punish violations not only by criminal sanctions and 
confiscation, but also by civil recovery measures and the levying of tax 
on the related benefits.119 These were significant changes compared to 
previous practices. At a time when lawmakers in other countries 
seemed far less enthusiastic, the United Kingdom was positioning itself 
 
114. The Sixth Directive (Oct. 2018) seems to have changed the situation by expanding 
and unifying the criminal law treatment of money laundering. It is unclear whether and how this 
will apply to the obligation to report suspicious activities. See Peter Burrell & Michael Thorne, 
The Sixth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive: What will change?, WILLKIE FARR & 
GALLAGHER  (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2019/02/The_Sixth_EU_Anti_Money_La
undering_Directive_What_Will_Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFU3-HKAT]. 
115. See the discussion on the UK Proceeds of Crime bill above and supra note 94. 
116. Peter Alldridge & Ann Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, 
25 LEGAL STUD. 353, 353 n.2 (2005) (citing Tony Blair declaring in a speech that “[I]t simply 
is not right in Modern Britain that millions of law-abiding people work hard to earn a living, 
whilst a few live handsomely off the profits of crime. The undeserved trappings of success 
enjoyed by criminals are an affront to the hard-working majority”).  
117.  Alldridge, supra note 1, 440; PETER ALLDRIDGE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH 
MONEY LAUNDERING LAW? 76 (2016) (“Tony Blair did very well out of profits of crime, and 
now David Cameron is appropriating it to his own ends”). 
118. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MOSCOW’S GOLD: 
RUSSIAN CORRUPTION IN THE UK 28 (2018), available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/932/932.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2K7-R7FW] (“While the Government should continue to respect the 
autonomy and constitutional integrity of the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies on 
devolved matters, money laundering is now a matter of national security, and therefore 
constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the UK. The Overseas Territories and Crown 
Dependencies are important routes through which dirty money enters the UK. This cannot 
continue”).  
119.  Alldridge & Mumford, supra note 116, at 358-59. 
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as a front-runner in the fight against financial crime and gold-plating 
its domestic measures.120 In this general political context, the inclusion 
of criminally-sanctioned lawyer reporting was presumably considered 
a minor feature of the overall agenda. The legal profession did express 
its opposition, arguing that the bill was too broadly drafted and would 
lead to a flow of “useless reports related to trivial breaches.”121 The 
debate on regime effectiveness continues to this day, although a recent 
consultation regarding the continuance of the regime did not lead to 
any significant change.122 
The British AML regime for lawyers raises a number of additional 
questions (which this Article does not claim to  answer). It could be an 
example of legislative overkill in light of the balance between costs 
generated and the regime’s overall effectiveness in achieving 
successful criminal prosecutions of primary offenders. The 
comparatively meager headcount of regulator staff also seems to be a 
concern. For instance, it was recently alleged that only twenty five 
persons at the NCA were tasked with processing the total number of 
SARs, including those filed by the entire British banking sector.123 In 
contrast, a survey conducted by the Law Society in 2008 indicated that 
law firms spent an average of four hours per week analyzing suspicions 
and making disclosures.124  Even with the drop in number of reports, 
voices within the profession claim that the regime is “cumbersome, 
 
120. See Tyre, supra note 97, at 77. 
121. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/15/proceeds-crime-act 
[https://perma.cc/U3W6-458U]. 
122.  The Law Commission’s report on reforming the SAR regime – guidance over 
change?, DENTONS (July 8, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2019/july/8/the-
law-commissions-report-on-reforming-the-sar-regime [https://perma.cc/876H-7HUH] 
(concluding that “little has been done to address the real concerns expressed about the operation 
of the regime”).  
123.  LAW COMM’N, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime 3, par. 1.25 (Consultation 
Paper No. 236, 20 July 20, 2018), available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-
prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/07/Anti-Money-Laundering-the-SARs-Regime-
Consultation-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6W7-CDBP]. Banks filed 371,522 SARs in the 
annual period 2017/2018, representing approximately 80% of the total of 463,938). SAR 2018, 
supra note 104, at 15-16. 
124. Id. at ¶ 1.22. See, e.g., Britain’s War on Dirty Money Lacks Oomph, THE ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/10/11/britains-war-
on-dirty-money-lacks-oomph [https://perma.cc/5KK4-LPJV]. 
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inefficient, and most importantly ineffective.”125  Their position seems 
supported by British scholars who pinpoint the absence of empirical 
research on overall effectiveness.126 For some of these scholars, 
administrative or professional control by self-regulating bodies might 
be more effective than criminal prosecution, particularly in light of the 
difficulty in successfully prosecuting facilitators who merely harbor a 
suspicion rather than principal offenders. They write that “regulatory 
action such as closing down a law firm or controlling how a lawyer 
may practice provides more direct public protection and indeed 
disruption, at less social cost, than does prosecution.”127 
A further question relates to the profession itself and its inability 
to have its views heard by the government over the years. Here, the 
division of the profession may be one explanation. As is well known, 
English (and Welsh) lawyers are divided between barristers and 
solicitors (with similar categories in Scotland and Northern Ireland). 
This division is not only functional but also relevant, at least to some 
extent, to traditional roles in society, with barristers forming a kind of 
aristocracy of the profession. It is mainly solicitors who are subject to 
AML obligations, as they (with conveyancing agents) are those most 
involved in the kind of transactional activities that give rise to the AML 
obligations.128 In contrast, barristers tend to specialize in contentious 
work that does not by nature fall within AML regulation. This division 
of labor may have affected the ability of solicitors to have their views 
fully heard at the political level. The presence since the Legal Services 
Act 2007 of a contingent of unregulated and therefore unrepresented 
practitioners may also be a factor.129 Finally, the attitude of existing 
representative organizations is also of interest. Contrary to the ABA in 
the United States, the English Law Society does not appear to view its 
 
125. Richard McGarry & Stephenson Harwood, SARs: A Need for Change but in which 
Direction? – The Law Commission Consults, STEPHENSON HARWOOD (Aug. 20, 2018),  
https://www.shlegal.com/news/sars-a-need-for-change-but-in-which-direction---the-law-
commission-consults [https://perma.cc/6KJ6-XRHL]. 
126. David Middleton & Michael Levi, Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organized Crime, 
Lawyers and the Regulation of Legal Services, 55 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 647, 649 n.1 (2015) (“The 
UK legal profession is by far the most likely in the world to report suspicions of money 
laundering by their clients, though there are no serious studies rigorously analysing either 
outputs or outcomes from these reports . . .”). See ALLDRIDGE, supra note 117, 77-78. 
127. Middleton & Levi, supra note 126, at 649-50. 
128.  See SAR 2018, supra note 104, at 15-16 (reflecting the significantly lower number of 
SARs filed every year by barristers e.g. 4 in 2018/2019, compared with 2,437 by solicitors). 
129.  See supra note 109. 
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role as that of vocal advocate defending solicitors against AML 
obligations imposed onto them from the outside. Their position seems 
rather the contrary. On its website the Law Society declares its 
commitment “to making the UK a hostile environment for illicit 
finances by helping solicitors in England and Wales act as gatekeepers 
to the UK financial system.”130 In their commentary on the 2017/2018 
reporting statistics, they wrote that “the legal sector still isn’t 
submitting enough SARs. We do not believe that there is a right number 
of SARs and instead urge solicitors to make a quality SAR when they 
spot suspicious activity.”131 This is a very different tone from that 
adopted by the ABA when confronting attempts to introduce AML 
obligations on US attorneys. 
In summary, the full scope of AML measures have for fifteen 
years been implemented by the British legal profession.132 The 
profession has complied with legislation and engaged with FIU 
reporting more than in other countries. Although this seems to have 
generated financial costs for the profession and the overall empirical 
effectiveness of the regime remains under question, the profession has 
been fairly understated in its challenge of the regime and has not, in 
particular, attempted to use the courts to do so. This is despite the fact 
that British AML regulation was significantly more ambitious from the 
outset than what international standards prescribed. 
V. FRANCE: COURT CHALLENGES AND ENLISTING THE BAR 
AUTHORITIES 
Similar to the United Kingdom, the French legal profession is 
divided. The largest group are the advocates (avocats), who have a full 
monopoly on court representation and outside legal advice and are 
 
130.  Anti-Money Laundering, THE LAW SOCIETY, 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-money-laundering/ 
[https://perma.cc/LE62-3XXG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
131. National Crime Agency SARs report: Implications for the legal sector, THE LAW 
SOCIETY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-
money-laundering/nca-sars-report-2018/ [https://perma.cc/XRJ6-NUVV]. 
132. In its latest Mutual Evaluation (2018), FATF reported the United Kingdom as 
“largely compliant” with regard to Recommendations 22 and 23 of the 2012 Recommendations. 
FATF, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures United Kingdom: 
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placed under the professional authority of regional bar associations, 
followed by the notaries (notaires), whose main activity is to handle 
property and estate transactions.133 Both groups are regulated 
separately under the auspices of dedicated laws.134 In-house lawyers do 
not belong to the regulated professions and do not benefit from any 
professional privilege (referred to as “professional secrecy,” secret 
professionnel).135 
One the early peculiarities of the French regime is that notaries 
have been required to report suspicious transactions as far back as 
1998, well before the Second Directive.136 This is explained by the fact 
that they have historically had a legal monopoly on all  property 
transactions, in which they act not so much as legal advisers to the 
parties, but as public officers (“officier ministériel”), in other words 
representatives of the state who are also tasked with the collection of 
transfer taxes.137 The status and traditions of advocates are very 
different. When AML regulation was first mooted for them by the 
Second Directive, their response was closer to the American position 
of outright defiance than to the British acceptance. Legislation to 
implement the Second Directive was first introduced in 2004,138 
 
133. There are approximately 69,000 advocates and 14,500 notaries. See Les chiffres clés 
de la profession d’avocat [Key figures of the legal profession], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES 
BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/fr/les-chiffres-cles-de-la-
profession-davocat [https://perma.cc/KPK4-9DZX] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport 
Annuel du Notariat [Annual Report of the Notary], NOTAIRES DE FRANCE [NOTAIRE OF 
FRANCE] (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.notaires.fr/fr/profession-notaire/rapport-annuel-du-
notariat/le-notariat-en-chiffres [https://perma.cc/HX5L-DUJR]. The number of regulated 
professionals is therefore less than half of the British number, for population and GDP that are 
similar. 
134.  Compare Law Nr. 71-113 of 31 December 1971 (amended by Law Nr. 90-1259 of 31 
December 1990) (regarding avocats) with Ordinance Nr. 45-2590 of 2 November 1945 
(regarding notaires); Ordinance Nr 58-1270 of 22 December 1958 (regarding judges and 
magistrates).  
135. See, e.g., L’avocat, le juriste d’entreprise et le secret [The advocate, the in-house 
lawyer, and secrecy], CHRISTIAN CHARRIERE-BOURNAZEL (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.charriere-bournazel.com/l%E2%80%99avocat-le-juriste-d%E2%80%99entreprise-
et-le-secret/ [https://perma.cc/5ZN2-NADK]. 
136.  Law Nr. 98-546 of 2 July 1998 codified at Article L-561.2.13 of the Monetary and 
Financial Code (CMF). C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CODE] art. L 561.3 (Fr.). 
137.  The Role of the French Notaire, NOTAIRES DE FRANCE [NOTAIRE OF FRANCE] (Nov. 
23, 2017), https://www.notaires.fr/en/notaire/role-notaire-and-his-principal-activities/role-
notaire [https://perma.cc/DXX9-WNFH]. 
138. Law Nr. 2004-130 of 11 February 2004. Loi 2004-130 du 11 février 2004 réformant 
le statut de certaines professions judiciaires ou juridiques, des experts judiciaires, des conseils 
en propriété industrielle et des experts en ventes aux enchères publiques (1) [Law 2004-130 of 
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followed by implementing decrees in 2006.139 Both the law and the 
decree were immediately challenged by the bar organizations (led by 
the National Bar Council, a federation of the regional bars) before the 
Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, leading to the 
removal of some of the decree provisions on direct communication 
channels between advocates and the French FIU.140 When further 
implementing legislation and decrees followed in the footsteps of the 
Third Directive, in 2009,141 they too were challenged by the bar 
organizations before the Conseil d’Etat, this time unsuccessfully.142 
The French bar had refrained from taking their case against the Second 
Directive and implementing provisions to the European Court of 
Justice, as a petition by the Belgian bar to their Constitutional Court 
had already made its way to Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling on 
the compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (concerning rights to a fair trial). It was bad fortune for all the 
European professions, therefore, when in 2007 the ECJ upheld the 
 
11 February 2004 on Reforming the Status of Certain Legal Professions, Judicial Experts, and 
Intellectual Property Advisers, and Auction Experts], C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL CODE] art. L-561.1 (Fr.). 
139. Décret 2006-736 du 26 juin 2006 relatif à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux 
et modifiant le code monétaire et financier (partie réglementaire) [Decree 2006-736 of June 26, 
2006 on the Fight Against Money Laundering and Modifying the Monetary and Financial Code], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE  [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
June 27, 2006, at 9625. 
140. CE Sect., April 10, 2008, Rec. Lebon 296845, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000018624326 
[https://perma.cc/GY3Y-H5U5]. 
141.  JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE],  Jan. 31, 2009, p. 1819. Ord. nº 2009-104 du 30 janvier 2009 relative à la prévention 
de l'utilisation du système financier aux fins de blanchiment de capitaux et de financement du 
terrorisme [Ordinance 2009-104 of 30 January 2009 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system to launder money and finance terrorism]. The CNB’s sweeping critique of its provisions 
was expressed in a report presented to its general assembly of 13 and 14 February 2009. Rapport 
sur L’ordonnance de transposition de la 3ème directive anti-blanchiment [Report on the 
transposition order of the third anti-money laundering directive], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES 
BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] (Feb. 13 and 14, 2009), 
https://encyclopedie.avocats.fr/GED_BWZ/192175791035/CNB-RP2009-02-
13_TXT_Blanchiment-ordonnance_Sacaze(P).pdf [https://perma.cc/W2NU-MFTU]. 
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Second Directive’s AML provisions on lawyers, on reasoning that will 
presented below.143 
 The French bar’s judicial challenges were not at an end, however. 
One of the members of the Paris Bar Council, Patrick Michaud, had 
brought an individual case before the Conseil d’Etat against the 
National Bar Council’s own AML implementation regulations adopted 
in 2007, 144 arguing that they were contrary to Articles 7 (legal 
certainty) and 8 (right to privacy) of the ECHR.145 In 2010, that petition 
was rejected by the Conseil d’Etat.146 Mr. Michaud’s next move was to 
file a case against France, before the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg, under Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 7 (legal certainty), 
and 8 (right to privacy) of the ECHR. The only claim seriously 
entertained by the Strasbourg Court was the one under Article 8,147 but 
it too was ultimately rejected. This final defeat marked the end of eight 
years of continuous judicial action by the French (and Belgian) bars 
against the Second Directive and ensuing national implementation 
measures. Contrary to the Canadian profession (which convinced its 
Supreme Court to strike down their AML reporting obligations), the 
European professions were ultimately unsuccessful in their two highest 
courts of Luxembourg and Strasbourg. 
The arguments that were presented in all of these proceedings 
were very similar to the ones still being made by the US bar. It was 
argued that the principles of professional secrecy and independence of 
 
143. Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des 
Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5335 [hereinafter Ordre des Barreaux]. 
144. See Conseil national des barreaux [CNB] [National Bar Council] decision No. 2007-
002, July 12, 2007, J.O. 13331 (Fr.) (“Décision à caractère normatif n° 2007-002 portant 
adoption d’un règlement relatif aux procédures internes destinées à mettre en oeuvre les 
obligations de lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux et le financement du terrorisme & 
Dispositif de contrôle interne destiné à assurer le respect des procédures”). 
145. Michaud v. France, App. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 15 [hereinafter 
Michaud].   
146. CE, July 23, 2010, Rec. Lebon 309993, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000022512920 
[https://perma.cc/7DNL-VH4U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
147. Michaud, supra note 145. The Strasbourg Court ruled that Mr. Michaud did not have 
standing to bring a claim under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) or Article 7 (legal certainty), 
because he himself had not suffered any proceedings and the rights of which he was alleging 
breach were not his own but those of others (i.e., clients). Michaud, ¶¶ 133-34. 
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lawyers are essential to democracy and European society,148 that these 
principles are protected under the ECHR,149 that lawyers have a duty 
of loyalty,150 that clients must be able to maintain trust and confide in 
them,151 and that such principles are eroded by the Second Directive’s 
AML reporting obligation in a manner that is neither necessary, 
consistent with justice or proportionate to the public interest at hand.152 
The arguments were presented by the plaintiffs, Mr. Michaud and the 
Belgian French-speaking and German-speaking Bar, but also by the 
CCBE, an organization representing the European bars and law 
societies, which was authorized to appear as intervening third party. 
There appear to be three main reasons why they were unsuccessful. 
First, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts found that AML rules 
only applied in the context of transactional or financial activities that 
are different from the traditional role of lawyers as legal counselors and 
advocates, and that it is the latter that form the basis of their 
professional right to secrecy.153 Under the Second Directive, AML 
procedures do not apply when a lawyer is engaged in the provision of 
legal advice, or once she is called upon for assistance in defending a 
client in contentious proceedings. At those points, the lawyer is exempt 
of any reporting obligations regardless of when information was 
received or obtained.154 Second, the Strasbourg Court found persuasive 
the fact that the Second Directive allows a filter between individual 
lawyers and financial intelligence units, in the form of the right given 
to each member state to organize communications only through 
national bar authorities.155 This, indeed, is the mechanism that has been 
implemented in France (see more on this below). Finally, both Courts 
were of the opinion that money-laundering constitutes a serious threat 
 
148. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 36 (referring to arguments by 
plaintiffs presenting lawyers’ secrecy as a principle found in all democracies and with roots in 
the “very foundations of European society”); Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 60. 
149. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 24. 
150. Id. ¶ 29 (the French version of the Opinion uses the expression “devoir de loyauté”); 
Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 67. 
151. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶¶ 37, 54; Ordre des Barreaux, 
supra note 143, ¶¶ 13-14 ; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 63. 
152. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 79; Michaud, supra note 145, 
¶¶ 63-64.  
153. Ordre des Barreaux, supra note 143, ¶¶ 33-35 ; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶¶ 27, 127-
28. 
154. Id. 
155. Michaud supra note 145, ¶¶ 129-30. 
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to society and democracy, and that AML interference in the  
professional rights of advocates for the activities listed by the Directive 
was therefore justified and not disproportionate.156 
The French bar was disappointed by these outcomes, but it 
regrouped and issued its next generation of AML professional 
guidelines. 157 Much of the focus is placed on the CDD measures, with 
detailed forms being provided on the type of verifications that must be 
performed before clients can be engaged or matters accepted (including 
beneficial owner identification).158 The STR obligation, for its part, is 
organized in such a manner that all communications must be sent to the 
head of the regional bar (bâtonnier), who is the only person authorized 
to enter into direct contact with the FIU.159 No direct communications 
between the FIU and individual advocates are permitted.160 
Transmission to the FIU of suspicious transaction reports received by 
the bâtonnier is not automatic,161 the bâtonnier’s role being to “assist 
colleagues, verify reports and ensure that no rules on professional 
secrecy are infringed.”162 A “confidential dialogue” may take place 
between the reporting advocate and the bâtonnier, which is not to be 
disclosed to the FIU.163 Most importantly, regardless of whether a 
suspicious transaction report is transmitted by the bâtonnier and 
regardless of the FIU’s response, the reporting lawyer must 
 
156. Ordre des Barreaux, supra note 143, ¶ 36; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 131. 
157. CONSEIL NATIONAL DES BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL], GUIDE PRATIQUE: 
LUTTE CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT ET LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME [PRACTICAL GUIDE : 
FIGHTING BLEACHING AND TERRORIST FINANCING] (2017) [hereinafter CNB Guide Pratique]. 
158.  Id. at 16-21. 
159.  Id. at 28. 
160. Id. at 26 (“aucune relation directe entre Tracfin et un avocat n’est . . . permise” [“No 
direct relationship between Tracfin and a lawyer is. . . permitted”]). 
161. Id. at 28 (“le bâtonnier ne retransmet pas de manière automatique à Tracfin les 
déclarations de soupçon qui lui sont adressées par les avocats. Son rôle consiste d’abord à 
assister ses confrères et à contrôler les déclarations reçues pour s’assurer de l’absence de tout 
manquement aux règles du secret professionnel” [“The bâtonnier does not automatically 
transmit to Tracfin the suspicious activity report sent to him by the advocate. His role is first to 
assist his colleagues and to control the reports received to ensure the absence of any breach of 
the rules of professional secrecy”]). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. (“Un dialogue, dont la nature confidentielle peut être opposée à Tracfin, peut ainsi 
s’établir entre le bâtonnier et l’avocat déclarant” [“A dialogue, the confidential nature of which 
can be opposed to Tracfin, can thus be established between the president and the reporting 
advocate”]). 
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immediately terminate his retainer or representation.164 The implication 
here is that for the French bar authorities, the very expression by a 
lawyer of her suspicions in writing means that she is no longer able to 
carry out her duties objectively and independently, and must therefore 
cease to act. One sees that the essence of these guidelines is very 
different from the British approach to suspicious transaction reporting. 
It may not be surprising, in this context, that the number of suspicious 
transaction reports received by the French FIU from the bar has 
remained very low since 2007. 
 
Chart 2: Number of STR reports received from the French bar 
(source: Tracfin annual reports)165 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
STRs 1 3 2 0 1 4 6 1 0 4 0 1 
 
There are several possible interpretations for these low figures. 
An uncharitable view would be that the French bar is openly defying 
its legal obligations, or that the French regime is not sufficiently 
dissuasive (failure to report not being sanctioned criminally, as in the 
United Kingdom). Such behavior would seem self-defeating, however, 
for a profession that sets great store in its public reputation. More 
constructive explanations can be found which are more persuasive. The 
 
164. Id. at 31 (“Dès lors que l’avocat a exprimé un soupçon, il a le devoir de se déporter 
immédiatement, il cesse toute participation, peu importe le retour de Tracfin” [“Once the 
reporting advocate has expressed a suspicion, he has the duty to withdraw immediately and cease 
any participation, regardless of the reponse by Tracfin”]). 
165. Rapport d’activité 2008 [Activity report 2008], TRACFIN 11, 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/rapports_acti
vite/2008_rapport_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EZW-QRYV] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); 
Rapport d’activité 2010 [Activity report 2010], TRACFIN 42, 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/rapports_acti
vite/2010_rapport_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EHD-G4NU] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); 
Rapport annuel d’analyse et d’activité 2012 [Annual analysis and activity report 2012], 
TRACFIN 52, 69, 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/RAAA_2012
_TRACFIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JRA-LL7K] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport annuel 
d’activité TRACFIN 2017 [Annual activity report TRACFIN 2017], TRACFIN 10, 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/ra-2017-tracfin.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGL6-B4J6] (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport annuel d’activité TRACFIN 2018 [Annual activity report 
TRACFIN 2018], TRACFIN 11, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/web_RAA_tracfin-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH4P-CL9U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
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main one is that French lawyers are focusing their efforts on upstream 
prophylactic measures, i.e. early identification and understanding of 
clients and transactions in order to minimize the risk that down the road 
they will be faced with a decision of whether or not to report. This is 
consistent with the structure of the current professional guidelines and 
was quite clearly explained in prior versions, under titles such as 
“dissuasion rather than denunciation.”166 It is explained that “the 
advocate’s true duty . . . is to know a client before acting for it.” 167 “By 
identifying clients, understanding the nature of transactions, 
convincing clients not to proceed and withdrawing services if they fail 
to convince, advocates are satisfying their [legal] obligations . . . .”168 
A lawyer’s duty is to monitor client activities and, should suspicions 
arise as to a future transaction, to dissuade them from proceeding. If a 
lawyer fails to convince his client not to proceed, then he must 
terminate the retainer or representation.169 This is a strategy that places 
the emphasis on due diligence and risk-prevention at the moment of 
client engagement and matter acceptance. Failure to achieve full clarity 
with respect to both is sanctioned by the immediate duty to terminate 
services. The downside is likely loss of economic opportunity, but it 
can be argued that this kind of arbitrage is generally consistent with 
French cultural preferences.170 A second, more technical explanation to 
the low number of reports received by the FIU is the traditionally wide 
definition under French law of information that is protected by 
advocate secrecy, a concept that is both wide and absolute. For 
example, it cannot be released by clients. This is where the bâtonnier 
filter may play its most critical role. 
The regime of client monies is also of interest, as it is a large 
source of SARs in the British system.171 In the French system, client 
monies held by advocates are placed under the control of regional 
 
166. See generally Dissuader pour ne pas dénoncer: Conseils de vigilance & de 
procédures internes destinés à prévenir l’utilisation de la profession d’avocat aux fins de 
blanchiment des capitaux d’origine illicite et de financement du terrorisme [Dissuading not to 
denounce: Guidance on vigilance & internal procedures to prevent the use of the profession of 
advocate for the purpose of money laundering and financing of terrorism], CONSEIL NATIONAL 
DES BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] (Jan. 2012), http://www.etudes-fiscales-
internationales.com/media/02/00/3729884604.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RSL-2HHS].  
167.  Id. at 8. 
168.  Id. at 8. 
169. CNB Guide Pratique, supra note 157, at 24. 
170. This is the view of the author as a French advocate and national. 
171.  See Part IV. 
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organizations, called the CARPAs, which are supervised by the bar 
councils.172 AML control over these funds is performed by the 
CARPAs themselves which can communicate freely with advocates, in 
which case the communications are covered by professional secrecy 
and cannot be disclosed to the FIU.173 The FIU is authorized to send 
enquiries to the CARPAs, but the CARPAs cannot respond directly and 
must send their responses to the bâtonniers, who may then 
communicate them to the FIU.174 The CARPAs are not under any 
independent reporting obligation and are not required by law to 
spontaneously report suspicions.175 Here too, the profession has 
internalized its AML procedures and placed it under the central control 
of the bar authorities and bâtonniers. 
The views of the head of the French FIU, surely a competent 
observer in such matters, seem to align with the more constructive 
interpretations regarding the low number of reports. In a recent 
interview he commented, somewhat wryly, that “at the end of the day, 
the scope of suspicious transaction reporting is so narrow that it is 
normal that there are so few—although there might possibly be 
more.”176 Overall, if one compares with the British reporting figures, 
there is indeed a discrepancy, which must therefore reflect the 
differences between the regimes. In the particular area of real estate 
transactions, however, French notary reporting activity has been 
steadily increasing and is now not unlike the SAR numbers that are 
reported in the field of UK conveyancing (see above). 
 
Chart 3: Number of STR reports received from French notaries 
(source: Tracfin annual reports)177 
 
 
172.  Règlement Intérieur National de la Profession d’Avocat (RIN) 2019 [National Rules 
of Procedure of the Advocate Profession (RIN) 2019], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES BARREAUX 
[NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] art. 6.2 (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/sites/default/files/rin_2019-09-12_consolide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H7WL-89LK]. 
173. CNB Guide Pratique, supra note 157, at 38. 
174. Id. at 39-40. 
175. Id.  
176. Entretien avec Bruno Dalles, directeur de Tracfin [Interview of Bruno Dalles, 
Director of the French FIU Tracfin], TENDANCE DROIT (Jan. 2018), 
http://www.tendancedroit.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/dpn1801entretien.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8Q2B-A8L3]. 
177. See supra note 165. 
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Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Notaries 313 347 370 674 1069 995 970 1040 996 1044 1401 1474 
 
In summary, after almost a decade of largely unsuccessful 
litigation in the country’s highest courts, the French profession is now 
placed under full AML regime.178 The system of compliance that has 
evolved is a centralized one with a significant element of self-
regulation. The bar authorities (bâtonniers) serve as central filters 
overseeing the articulation of AML obligations with traditional rules of 
confidentiality and conduct. The reporting obligation, for its part, is 
managed by way of emphasis on upstream prophylactic measures 
before client and matter acceptance. The system is geared toward the 
protection of traditional standards of conduct, and the profession is 
implicitly accepting to pay the potential price in the form of reduced 
activity or loss of economic opportunity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Without seeking to read too much into the comparisons that have 
been drawn, it seems possible to formulate certain wider lessons, 
findings, or interrogations. 
First, the introduction of AML controls over lawyers and legal 
professionals is primarily a function of the political will of lawmakers. 
This may sound self-evident, but POCA in the United Kingdom and 
the Second Directive in the European Union were forceful measures 
underpinned by strong political convictions regarding the need to 
reform the financial system. Where that political conviction does not 
exist, mandatory AML measures on lawyers seem unlikely. This seems  
relevant in the US context. 
Second, the US legal profession remains an outlier that has been 
successful not only in blocking AML reform directly affecting it, but 
also other related policies, such as corporate transparency. Through the 
 
178.  The FATF’s latest Mutual Evaluation Report of France is quite old (2011). In this 
report, FATF rated France as “partially compliant” with regard to the 2003 Recommendations 
on lawyer-related CDD, record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting. Id. at 24-26. See 
generally Rapport d’évaluation mutelle de la France: Lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux 
et le financement du terrorisme [Mutual Evaluation Report of France: Fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism], FATF (Feb. 25, 2011), https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20France%20ful.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2QJ-RPL9]. 
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semantical use of the expression gatekeeper, the battle against 
international AML standards has been joined with other professional 
battles against the SEC and other domestic agencies. The US critique 
has specifically targeted the FATF as an institution and questioned its 
legitimacy. Generally, the US legal profession’s success is indicative 
of its deep integration in the US political economy and its powerful 
voice in domestic affairs. 
Third, the European Union is clearly a frontrunner in AML 
regulation. Its lawyer-related measures in the Second Directive 
reflected the 2003 recommendations before they were even published 
by the FATF and, it is argued, facilitated their diffusion. This has not 
been the main topic of this Article, but it seems that the tight 
cooperation between the FATF and EU institutions is a crucial 
component of global AML norm design and implementation.179 
Fourth, the European system shows that there are different ways 
of rolling out transnational regulatory standards. The AML lawyer-
related provisions of the European Directives apply to all the member 
states, but they allow a measure of national discretion and can be rolled 
out through national implementing statutes that are closer to country 
tradition. A central lever of discretion is the ability to involve 
professional bar authorities in the operation of the national regimes, an 
option that was exercised to maximum effect in France, but not in the 
United Kingdom. This may have allowed the French profession to 
retain greater control over AML regime implementation. This 
versatility of national regimes and professional responses runs counter 
to the US critique centering on the one-size-fits-all dimension of the 
FATF standards.  
Yet another comment pertains to the voice of the European 
professions in the European institutional system. The French 
profession, and other continental professions like in Belgium, deployed 
significant effort to obtain judicial relief from some of the AML 
measures in its national courts and in the two highest European courts 
of Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Looking beyond the legal arguments, 
it is interesting to ask oneself why these attempts were unsuccessful. Is 
it possible that the European professions and the judges in Luxembourg 
 
179. See generally Valsamis Mitsilegas & Niovi Vavoula, The Evolving EU Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime: Challenges for Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 23 MAASTRICHT 
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 261 (2016); Leonardo Borlini & Francesco Montanaro, The Evolution of the 
EU Law Aagainst Criminal Finance: The “Hardening” of FATF Standard Within the EU, 48 
GEO. J. INT’L   L. 1009 (2017). 
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or Strasbourg are too distant from one another to form a common 
cultural community? At the very least, one can say that the European 
legal professions have less voice in the EU institutional system than the 
US legal profession in its own system. 
A final comment is regarding the effectiveness of these AML 
regimes. It seems entirely normal that the commercial bar should 
participate in AML policy implementation and not hide behind claims 
of “lawyer exceptionalism” or roles as “guardians” of the rule of law. 
The lack of empirical research on the positive effects of lawyer-related 
AML measures remains problematic, however, and should if possible 
be remedied. It must also be acknowledged that effective AML 
monitoring by lawyers can be difficult. Risk identification can be 
impeded by high levels of intermediation of cross-border financial 
flows and the long length of cross-border service supply chains, which 
generate information asymmetries.180 In such circumstances, law firms 
sometimes have limited visibility on the full activities of their overseas 
clients. If not accompanied by wider structural measures such as 
transnational corporate transparency reform or general increase in 
government resources devoted to financial monitoring, the risk is that 
delegation of AML functions to lawyers in the private  sector may bear 




180. On information asymmetry created by the use of offshore companies, see generally 
Delphine Nougayrède, The Use of Offshore Companies in Emerging Market Economies: A Case 
Study, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. LAW. 401 (2017); Delphine Nougayrède, After the Panama Papers: 
A Private Law Critique of Shell Companies, 51 THE INT’L L. (2019). 
